Tracking Global Corporate Citizenship: Some Reflections on ‘Lovesick' Companies by Grahame Thompson
Institute for International Integration Studies  
IIIS Discussion Paper  
No.192 / December 2006
Tracking Global Corporate Citizenship: Some Reflections
on ‘Lovesick’ Companies. 
Grahame Thompson
IIIS and the Open University 
 



























    Disclaimer 
   Any opinions expressed here are those of the author(s) and not those of the IIIS. 
   All works posted here are owned and copyrighted by the author(s).   
   Papers may only be downloaded for personal use only. 











This paper provides an outline of some of the issues I am dealing with in connection 
to a research project being undertaken on Global Corporate Citizenship (GCC). This 
research is in its early stages so what is provided here is preliminary and designed to 
raise rather more issues than it solves. In particular, I am concerned to deal with what 
it might mean for companies to be described, or to describe themselves, as Global 
Corporate Citizens. In the general literature on corporate responsibility there is a 
move away from companies being described, or describing themselves, as 
Corporately Socially Responsible (CSR) to them re-describing themselves as Global 
Corporate Citizens (GCC). I want to ask what is involved in this (self)description as 
‘citizens’? Can citizenship be applied first to companies and then extended into the 
global arena in which they operate? 
 
When looking at the actual practices of companies that claim to be either simply 
socially responsible or more recently corporate citizens, there is not much difference 
between them. Much the same ‘content’, as it were, in terms of the claims to what 
they are doing or should do, adheres under both titles. So is it merely a matter of 
words? Does it make any difference that on the one had they claim to be socially 
responsible or on the other to be global citizens? I will argue that this is a very 
significant change in terminology that is having, and will continue to have, significant 
affects that need to be analysed and appreciated. To explore these implications, the 
following analysis situates GCC in a wider framework of the progressive 
juridicalization and constitutionalization of the international arena more generally. 
 
From National to Global Considerations 
 
Several important issues follow when considering the fate of political citizenship as 
claimed in an international context. Traditionally, citizenship pertains to a particular 
territorially defined and designated polity, one characterized by a ‘constitution’ of a 
sort (whether written or unwritten) that lays down a certain Grundnorm for that polity 
(Kelsen 1945 – see below). This defines the rights and obligations associated with 
citizenship broadly speaking. But what happens in an international context? What 
does ‘globalization’ do to citizenship or for citizenship? Other than undermining the 
clear link between territory, jurisdiction and citizenship can it inaugurate a different 
field or domain for citizenly behaviours and activities, one in which, for instance 
corporations can legitimately claim a new form of global citizenship (Logsdon & 
Wood 2002, Post 2002, Crane & Matten 2005, Thompson 2005)? 
 
A preliminary issue is whether national legal orders have ever been quite as distinct as 
they are commonly thought, and one for which the present advent of globalization 
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recognition already presumes a certain common terrain of legal communication within 
which territorial distinctions are marked. Thus ‘judicial borrowings’ between states 
are nothing new. And territories themselves are perhaps less about drawing 
geographical or spatial boundaries than they are about drawing social distinctions 
between peoples. ‘Territory’ is primarily a way of dividing up and governing people, 
not space. In addition, jurisdiction does not necessarily coincide with territory. 
Jurisdiction is either claimed or designated by a definite act that provides legitimacy 
and force for juridical undertakings.  Take the European Court of Justice for instance  
(the nearest the EU  has to a supreme court). This does not have any inherent 
jurisdiction either over the territory of the EU states or in terms of some ‘natural’ 
defence for the rule of law. Rather it has jurisdiction only in so far as the EU Treaties 
and similar instruments have conferred jurisdiction upon it in particular areas. It is a 
creature of the Treaties, and one limited by their embrace. (In commercial and civil 
matters, EU jurisdiction is handled by the 1968 Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction.) 
Similarly with the way that some US courts operate extra-territorially, so as to claim 
jurisdiction over matters that either do not happen on their territory or which take 
place in another jurisdiction (as in the case of the US Patriot Act and Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act, and for companies the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA))
i.  
 
One of the contexts in which this issue has arisen is in the debate about the possible 
emergence of a Lex Mercatoria (new merchant law). This refers to a transnational 
legal order for global markets that has developed outside of national or international 
law strictly speaking (though it is often thought to be heavily implicated in the latter – 
e.g. Delaume 1989). MNCs, for instance, have arrived at commercial contracts that 
they submit neither to national jurisdiction nor to national substantive law. Instead 
they agree on international arbitration and the application of a transnational common 
code or law that is independent of any national legal order. This is often thought to be 
a form of ‘global law without a state’. Indeed, for some, this development is at last 
destroying law’s hierarchy – killing the sovereign father (and with it the ‘Kings two 
bodies’), exposing the law’s paradoxes and triggering its self-destruction (Tuebner 
1997a, p.777). Globalization in thus the harbinger of a truly heterarchical and 




In the matter of citizenship the classic distinction is between ‘status’ and ‘acts’ 
citizenship. ‘Acts’ citizenship stresses active engagement or involvement in public 
affairs and in the public sphere. Such acts invoke a civic virtue. But they are 
necessarily voluntaristic and behavioural in character, and ultimately represent a 
‘claim’ only. Agents can in principle pick and chose which aspects of citizenly 
behaviours they wish to uphold or stress. This conception mainly plays on a 
normative dimension, stressing the ethical aspects of citizenship and liberal ‘shared 
values’. 
 
On the other hand ‘status’ citizenship invokes rights and obligations determined 
within the context of a definite polity that are embodied in a clear legal form. They 
are associated with the democratic exercise of membership, the undertaking of formal 
duties and obligations, and with legitimacy and accountability. Here the 
characteristics of citizenship are thrust upon citizens in a ‘take it all’ fashion. They 
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mobilization during war). 
 
One context in which this distinction is pertinent, and in which the possible 
emergence of a different kind of citizenship can be considered, is the growing interest 
in the idea of ‘global corporate citizenship’ (GCC) (Logsdon & Wood 2002, Post 
2002, Thompson 2005). A small but expanding number of large companies are 
claiming to be ‘good global corporate citizens’, particularly MNCs that operate in a 
number of countries where local production standards are variable or non-existent. In 
their promulgation of internal standards associated with the ethical, environmental 
and working conditions associated with their businesses, these companies claim a 
certain citizenly status. In addition, there are a vast range of organizations that are 
promoting the idea of GCC: various international and national public agencies, private 
professional bodies and associations, stock-market indexing and credit rating 
companies, charitable organizations, religious based organizations, (I)NGOs, and 
many others besides. A preliminary way of making some sense of this matrix of 
advocacy, monitoring and scrutiny in outlined later. 
 
But before that it is worthwhile trying to make some preliminary sense of company 
attitudes towards CRS and GCC (Ward and Smith 2006). This is done in the context 
of Figure 1. 
 
[Figure 1 near here] 
 
Companies can be divide into those who might think social and ethical values (s&ev) 
are central for their business activity and those who think these are irrelevant. This is 
shown along the horizontal axis. On the other hand there is the business and financial 
rewards dimension to company activity. Do they think that a commitment to s&ev 
enhances their bottom line or is irrelevant to it, or, perhaps put slightly differently, 
would the market reward these business for their commitment, or otherwise, to s&ev? 
This dimension is shown on the vertical axis. 
 
We could begin to place different companies in the four cells marked out by the 
figure, and what is shown is a preliminary classification. It contains some headings, 
some sector affiliation and some possible named companies. None of this distribution 
is meant to be rigorous. It is for illustrative purposes only. The ‘Bottom Feeders’ 
would be those that felt a commitment to s&ev to be irrelevant, and that it would have 
no impact on their financial and business rewards or performance. At the other 
extreme are those companies that felt s&ev to be vital to their business and that it 
would have, and indeed does have, a very significant impact on their financial and 
business performance. These are designated the ‘FTSE4Good-ers’, named after the 
FTSE index on which the leading socially responsible companies are to be found (see:   
< http://www.ftse.com/Indices/FTSE4Good_Index_Series/index.jsp>). Between these 
tow cells lie to ‘Cynics’ on the one hand and the ‘Ethical Traders’ on the other.  
 
The former represent those companies who might think that s&ev are basically 
irrelevant, but that recognize a pragmatic commitment to these is a sensible (if 
unfortunate) necessity because it does provide financial and business rewards and 
benefits. Often these are the companies that have experiences a public campaign 
against their activities (or who wish to ensure against one), and who want to present a 
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s&ev in business, or who advocate for this, moving companies from this cell to the 
top left hand side one is the main objective. 
 
Finally, there are the ‘Ethical traders’ who are fully committed to s&ev but who reap 
a thin reward from it. In part this would be because the importance of s&ev to 
business outcomes is not yet fully recognized by the market in these cases. 




What Figure 1 does is provide an initial mechanism for classifying company activity 
in respect to social and ethical values in business. It presents the ‘company layer’ of 
the full CSR/GCC picture. Below two further layers to this picture are built up, one 
dealing with advocacy and scrutiny organizations and the other in respect to the 
overall governance framework. Before that, let us get back to the issue of citizenship 
in respect to companies and examine the relationships between acts and status 
citizenship in this respect. There are several possible ways of linking these two sets of 
concerns, i.e. status and acts citizenship. Here I pursue these linkages via a discussion 
of the concepts of ‘networks’, constitutionalization, and juridicalization. As will be 




The idea of networks has had a central place in analyses of the international system in 
a number of different contexts (Thompson 2003, chp.7). Recently networks have been 
directly introduced into the area of the juridicalization and constitutionalization of the 
international system via Anne-Marie Slaughter’s widely read and commented upon 
book A New Word Order (Slaughter 2004; for commentary see, for instance, 
Berkowitz 2005, Perju 2005 and Mills & Stephens 2005 – and see also Appelbaum, et 
al 2001). In this book Slaughter argues there is a growing international cross-
fertilization of legal systems driven by the making of judicial decisions on the basis of 
considerations and precedents set by foreign courts; what she characterises as an 
international network of courts, judges, legal scholars and other officials. These 
networks are producing new forms of judicial reasoning and judgement that are 
thoroughly trans-national and trans-territorial in character, she argues. But – and here 
is the interesting and important feature – for her these judgements are made in the 
context of domestic courts. They are not made by international courts, in which she 
places little confidence. Thus her approach goes to reinforce the importance of 
domestic courts and municipal justice in codifying international law as against 
international courts and ‘global justice’. This emergent global networking system, 
however, is to be encouraged, she suggests, as an expression of a new global civic 
society. I return to the specific character of this-- as I see it -- later. 
 
The idea of networking is also salient in terms of how law firms are themselves 
internationalising (Morgan and Quack 2005). One way is to develop an explicit 
network model of organization through the formation of a kind of international 
‘federation of partnerships’, gaining access to different national markets though 
affiliation with overseas firms and gaining expertise in different legal systems on the 
back of resource and competence exchanges within the extended partnerships. 
Although this is not a particular strength of how American legal firms have expanded 
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US firms is a key feature of the way the law is internationalising via the spread of US 
legal norms and practices; it is spearheaded by American law firms. 
 
The question of the progressive constitutionalization and juridification of the 
international arena has arisen in several functional areas and institutional contexts. 
The main functional areas are trade/commercial activity, human rights and the 
conduct of wars/conflicts. The main institutional contexts from the point of view of 
trade activity are the WTO in particular and the EU. From the point of view of 
commercial activity involving companies, it is the UN, OECD and various 
international arbitration bodies that represent the leading institutional thrust, plus 
activity dependent upon US legal regulation. There is a massive literature on this but I 
confine my comments to several of the more pertinent aspects that suit the purpose of 




The background features to the ‘constitutionalization of the international system’ in 
the economic sphere (the one most pertinent to the idea of GCC) is agued to be a 
transformation in the nature of liberal internationalism; namely a move away from 
‘embedded liberalism’ towards that of ‘neo-liberalism’ in the conduct of international 
trade matters (Howse & Nicolaïdis 2001; Walters and Larner 2004 – actually, what is 
missing here is a reference to Wilsonian liberalism, which is important in judging the 
approach of Slaughter referred to above. This is taken up later).  
 
Embedded liberalism – something argued to have characterized much of the post-
Second World War period in the 20
th Century -- was essentially seen as a political 
compromise between countries, where they gave up the worst excesses of 
protectionism in exchange for the possibility of some autonomy in the conduct of 
domestic economic policy making, particularly in the area of macro-economic 
management. It involved diplomatic bargaining between countries to establish 
compromises on trade policy, as exemplified by the GATT mechanism. The key 
criterion in international trade talks was that of non-discrimination between partners 
as embodied in the ‘most favoured nation’ (MFN) clauses of the successive GATT 
negotiating rounds and treaties (trading terms negotiated with a favoured trading 
partner should be extended to all other trading partners, i.e. there should be no 
discriminations between them). Difficult to uphold and police -- and therefore often 
compromised as it was in practice -- this regime lasted roughly from the early-1950s 
until the late-1970s when one of its crucial supports – the semi-fixed exchange rates 
and a de facto dollar standard – was abandoned in favour of a flexible exchange rate 
regime. 
 
This ushered in the period of neo-liberalism as market and competitive solutions were 
sought for economic problems. The key criterion for negotiations also changed as 
obstacles gradually displaced non-discrimination as the object of policy. This in turn 
opened up to international scrutiny the domestic economic characteristics of trading 
countries in the context of their internal regulatory practices and the conditions for 
market access. Along with this, the emphasis on the market was accompanied by 
moves away from political bargaining towards the resort to international public and 
private law as the means to settle disputes. In its wake the GATT (an ‘agreement’) 
  5was replaced by the establishment of the WTO (an ‘institution’) to oversee trade 
matters. The WTO mechanism is one recognized in international law, and its practices 
are those that have led to charges that trade law is being ‘constitutionalized’ 
particularly as its Appellate Body (AB) delivers judgements on appeals over Panel 
Rulings on trade matters (Cass 2005).  
 
The differences between the GATT and the WTO tend to revolve around the 
consequences of dispute resolution mechanisms in each case (Howse 2000).  Under 
the GATT a consensus of member states was required in order for dispute rulings to 
become binding. This involved the creation of a ‘positive consensus’. Dispute rulings 
were drafted with a ‘diplomatic vagueness’ often expressing an intuitive kind of law, 
one based on shared experiences and unspoken assumptions. It was driven by a rather 
cosy bureaucratic and technocratic ‘club’ culture, based upon shared values and a 
consensus that supported economic liberalism on essentially pragmatic grounds, and it 
met in closed session. One feature was that compliance was rather high. 
 
With the WTO, however, dispute rulings are accepted as binding unless all the 
members – including the winning party – vote against its adoption (requiring a more 
difficult to achieve ‘negative consensus’). In addition, determinations of when and 
how the loosing party must act to implement a ruling are subject to arbitration, and 
should the loosing party not implement a ruling in accordance with the findings of the 
arbitrator, retaliation (involving the withdrawal of trade concessions to the loosing 
party by the winning party) is automatically authorized. Moreover, as noted above, 
the legal determinations of any Panel (known as a ‘tribunal of first instance’) may be 
appealed to the AB (which is a standing tribunal of seven jurists, three of whom sit in 
each case). The establishment of the AB, then, meant that the relatively ‘informal’ 
nature of the previous GATT disputes mechanism was undermined. As an 
adjudicative institution, separated from the bureaucratic and technical culture, the AB 
is open to review and scrutiny and embodies contestable legal interpretations where 
values can no longer be presumed to be shared. In this context economic liberalism 
became much more of a dogmatic insistence (in a sharp laissez-faire style), rather 
than accepted as a shared pragmatic compromise. 
 
The results of the AB decisions then become precedents and have force of 
international law, though they were not formally part of the original treaty agreement, 
and nor are they mandated by any clear political process other than that initiated by 
the general WTO Treaty signed in 1995 (Broude 2004). A key change is thus with the 
new liberal technology of rule embodied in the WTO disputes mechanism and the 
AB, which involves a novel way to adjudicate and enforce obligations in an 
international economic context (though it tends to mirror the adversarial practices of 
Anglo-American adjudication -- see below). 
 
Two other elements in this transformation are also worth noting. The first of these 
involves the shift from what is often termed ‘cooperative-competition’ between states 
towards ‘competitive-cooperation’. The key change is the move of competition to the 
forefront of the relationships between states in the economic field. Whereas before, 
states found it efficient and convenient to cooperate between themselves to foster 
‘limited’ and ‘managed’ competition, or at least to ‘accommodate’ competition, now 
the issue is the perceived centrality of competition in the relationships between states, 
where cooperation between them – such that it is – is afforded a secondary status and 
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‘international common law’ becomes necessary to adjudicate disputes between what 
are now considered to be competing parties: diffuse reciprocity has given way to 
competition between policy norms. Inter-governmental cooperation in setting up a 
body like the WTO only goes to further the mechanisms of competitive relationships 
that it is designed to support, where ‘common values’ cannot any longer necessarily 
be presumed or shared. 
 
Of course, the WTO does not involve companies directly since it is an 
intergovernmental organization settling trade disputes only between governments. 
However, it involves companies indirectly in that these lobby governments to take up 
grievances and are often instrumental in pressing for changes in WTO rules (in their 
favour)
iii. But a further development is more directly associated with MNC activity. 
The shift from embedded liberalism to neo-liberalism arises because the integration of 
the international economy may itself have moved from a position of ‘shallow 
interdependency’ to one of ‘deep integration’. Shallow interdependency involved 
rather straightforward trade exchanges between otherwise relatively ‘closed’ 
economies. With the growth of FDI and the operation of MNCs however, deeper 
integration has occurred. FDI and MNCs ‘open-up’ domestic economies to 
international economic pressures in a novel way, so that issues of domestic ‘obstacles’ 
to access and the domestic regulatory practices designed to support this become an 
impediment to trade openness and an object of scrutiny and policy. 
 
 
What Does Consitutionalization Mean? 
 
There are many definitions of ‘constitutionalization’ (for an accessible discussion of 
definitions and issues see Loughlin 2004).  Broadly speaking this can be seen as those 
social practices that constrain economic and political behaviour and that give 
substance to civic duties and obligations (thus directly implicating ‘acts’ and 
‘statuses’). According to Cass (2004) constitutionalization involves six features. 
These are shown in the vertical dimension to Figure 2. These features include: the 
involvement of a political community, processes of participation and deliberation in 
law making, a realignment of relationships between parties (what or who has 
comptenz-competenz), social acceptance and legitimacy, a new fundamental device or 
‘norm’ (Grundnorm – Basic Law), and finally new behavioural constraints. In 
addition, there are several approaches to constitutionalization or areas where it is 
newly operative. These are shown along the horizontal dimension in Figure 2. They 
included: institutional and managerial rule making, rights based constitutionalism, 
judicial norm generation, and transnational or transformational constitutionalization – 
broadly involving all those networks of judicial reasoning mentioned above (and the 
one favoured by both Slaughter and Cass). 
 
[Figure 2 near here] 
 
It might be tempting to begin filling in the matrix boxes show in Figure 2 with the 
idea of GCC in mind, but at this stage I leave this as a possibility to be undertaken 
after further analysis. In addition, it is not altogether clear at this stage that this is an 
entirely appropriate framework in the case of GCC, since there is not as yet much 
specific and formal constitution building going on in this area it would seem (as 
  7pointed out below, at the moment it is more like quasi- juridicalization, or informal 
constitution building). 
 
Clearly, any such constitution building in this or any other areas could implicate 
‘citizenly activities’ of a sort. Indeed, one of the interesting points to have emerged 
from preliminary investigations is that acts and statuses can be appropriately 
discussed in this context. There are good reasons to be sceptical of the whole acts 
approach to citizenship leading instead to a stress on the fundamental importance of 
status as the basis of citizenship. Why is status of such fundamental importance? It is 
because status citizenship as conferred by law is very difficult to undermine. It 
provides security against its easy denial. Acts citizenship, on the other hand, is much 
easier to undermine since it is transitory and ultimately amounts to a claim only: it can 
be simply denied or ignored (of course, this also makes it easier to invoke). In part 
this scepticism is also due to the rather loose way ‘citizenship’ is discussed in the 
context of sociological and cultural approaches to citizenship. In fact, there is an 
interesting literature to be explored here, e.g. Ong (1999) and Lowenhaupt Tsing 
(2005) who take an explicitly ethnographic approach to identifying ‘cultural 
citizenship’ as diasporic and emigrant communities spread across the globe creating 
multiple identities. As yet, however, these have not figured centrally in the 
discussions of citizenship that I am aware of and the overwhelming approach in a 
cultural context is still to over emphasise acts and to neglect statuses (as designated by 
law). However, it may be that genuinely citizenly statuses can be conferred other than 
by law – through various cultural mechanisms perhaps. At this stage I leave this for 
further investigation. 
 
On the other hand, in the realm of law there is a strong tradition that emphasises 
behavioural acts, and this is the basis of a critique of the whole international 
constitutionalization process from those hostile to it. For instance Rabkin (2004), 
offers a polemical neo-conservative riposte to this trend which, despite its provenance 
– or, perhaps, precisely because of it – provides some telling arguments against the 
notion of international constitutionalization (and the ‘pooling of sovereignty’ idea 
which is associated with it in his mind) which on the surface at least seem quite 
compelling.  
 
But an approach to law known as the pure theory of law, as originally advanced by 
Hans Kelsen (1945), provides a more theoretically telling account of the possible 
relationships between acts and status citizenship. Kelsen developed his approach in 
the 1920s very much in a Civil Law context, though in his 1945 book he argues this 
can be extended to a Common Law environment. In a long section entitled 
Nomodynamics he discusses the notion of ‘norm’ as a key constituent in the 
construction of a positive legal order (pp.111-78). On page 149 he suggests “The 
judicial decision may also create a general norm.” This introduces a section on the 
role of judicial acts in creating law. For Kelsen there is the original act of the 
constitution (a political act I think) which creates the realm of the Basic Norm 
(Grundnorm), and then there are various ‘subsequent’ judicial acts involving 
lawyering and decisions by judges which create what he calls ‘general norms’. These 
general norms then constitute precedents for subsequent legal decisions. But this kind 
of judicial act of creating a new individual (but of necessity also general?) norm 
operates by applying a previously established and higher level norm. In doing this the 
judge must establish the presence of the conditions of the general norm which are 
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and sanction, and stipulate the penalties. In this way these judicial acts are constitutive 
(of law), rather than simply clarificatory (of already existing law), or declaratory (of 
verdicts, for instance). And here legal ‘acts’ are the handmaiden of legal ‘statuses’, 
which thereby could provide a rigorous way of reconciling the two aspects of 
citizenship if pushed further. Of course, this also makes (legal) ‘acts’ the progenitor of 
‘statuses’. But it should be noted that this discussion of norms has nothing necessarily  
to do with ‘ethical norms’. 
 
Indeed, Kelsen’s development of his ‘pure theory’ approach was designed to precisely 
avoid introducing ‘moral’ issues into the foundation of Law. Normativity for him is a 
matter of the Law specifying what should be done (an ‘ought’ process) but one 
grounded in the validity and legitimacy of certain authorities to ‘will’ such an activity, 
not one grounded in their ethical proclivities. Of course, this is the site of a long 
dispute, and Kelsen was less than consistently clear as to how this is organized and its 
meaning (for a representative introduction to the state of the debate see Paulson & 
Paulson 1998; for more recent contributions that follow up on the issues of the role of 
language acts in constituting law, and their relationship to statuses originally 
conferred by the Grundnorm (an ‘is/ought’ event) see Bindreiter 2001, van Roermund 
2002, and Conklin 2006). Clearly, this requires further theoretical reflection, 
clarification and elaboration, which I leave for another time. 
 
Of course, this opens up a fresh set of problems in its own right. It has led, for 
instance, to the idea that a ‘global constitution’ could be being brought into being 
precisely as more and more acts of this type are promulgated, indeed as more and 
more people just talk about it (since speech is an act as well). In the case of GCC, the 
more companies and others claim to be ‘global corporate citizens’ the more likely 
they are to be believed and the more likely this will actually come about in the form 
of a self-fulfilling prophesy (e.g., in the case of the UN’s Global Compact referred to 
later see in particular McIntosh, Waddock & Kell 2004). In a somewhat different 
register, this looks like the tactic being used by David Held (Held 2004 -- amongst 
others e.g. Falk 2000) in calls for a ‘new global covenant’ and international 
cosmopolitanism. The constant invocation of such a programme could possibly call it 
into being if enough are persuaded of its virtue. Here we see, then, a possible 




It is important to note that not all of the juridicalization of the international is a form 
of constitutionalization. Constitutionalization is a limited form of the juridicalization 
of the international sphere, which itself can take many forms and involve many legal 
and regulatory practices (Grimm 2005, Kelemen and Sibbitt 2005, Levi-Faur 2005). It 
is centrally associated with international public law. The classic subjects of 
international public law are sovereign states, not citizens as such, and sovereign states 
decide for themselves which pieces of international law they accept. Unlike citizens 
who are subject to the law of the land, even if they disagree with it (see above), states 
are subject only to that international law they chose to formally ratify. States must 
give their explicit consent, even in the case of customary international law. And they 
can in principle pick and chose which parts of treaties or conventions they chose to 
ratify. 
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But in addition to this public international law there is, of course, natural and private 
law (Weinrib 1955). Here is where the question of the juridicalization of the 
international most controversially arises. A key feature of this process – and the one 
that takes it into its most developed form – is to see the emergence of a truly global 
‘private authority’ via the establishment of a set of institutions that arbitrate private 
contracts. Amongst these bodies are the Paris based International Chamber of 
Commerce, the London Commercial Court, and the International Law Association. In 
addition, there are a series of intergovernmental organizations like the United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law and its Institute for the Unification of Private 
Law, the International Maritime Organization, the Hague Conference on Private 
International Law (and many others besides, see Cutler 2003) that operate to codify, 
unify and adjudicate such private law. The question is what do these amount to and 
how important are they in the ‘global’ legal system? 
 
For the likes of Gunter Teubner (1997a, 1997b, 2002) these developments are a key 
indicator of a wider radical transformation of the international system wrought by the 
forces of ‘globalization’. In Teubner’s new world globalization finally breaks the link 
connecting the law to democratically constituted political discourses and practices. It 
produces a double fragmentation; cultural polycentrism and functional differentiation. 
New ‘linkage institutions’, like those mentioned immediately above, create a new law 
directly by transjurisdictional operations without being translated into formal political 
issues. They escape and evade regulatory claims of both national and international 
law and practice, and form a legal sovereignty of their own. This global law has no 
legislation, no political constitution, no politically ordered hierarchy of norms. It is a 
‘polycontextual’ law; law with multiple sources displaying no unifying perspective, 
produced by different mutually exclusive discourses of society. Such a system of 
recursive legal operations works in terms of more than one code, combining 
conjunctural and disjunctural operations, connected through transjurisdictional 
operational networks. It displays a heterarchical multitude of legal orders rather than a 
clear and traditional differentiation into legislation and adjudication; a plurality of law 
production comprising a patchwork of ethnic and religious minority laws, rules of 
standardization, variable professional disciplines, contracting, intra- and inter-
governmental rule making, etc. Curbing the abuses of power – by the rule of law in 
the traditional sense – will not help in civilizing this many headed hydra. Indeed, we 
must face the impossibility of constitutionalizing this legal multiplicity in the 
language of legal restraint or the arbitrariness of the sovereign.  In the final analysis, 
there is no sovereign power left. 
 
What to make of this vision? The problem is that it may be little more than an 
interesting flight of fancy. Even Teubner recognizes that such law – if it exists in a 
stable and significant form – is always judged against and according to existing legal 
orders. Indeed, the strong trend in the contexts that Teubner celebrates is towards the 
Anglo-Americanization of such law (Teubner 1997 a, p.782; Kelemen, & Sibbitt 
2004; Levi- Faur 2005, Applebaum, et al 2001, Part 4). It is being driven by 
international legal firms and MNCs who all still have their own strong national 
organizational patterns and routines. The older and traditional trans-European network 
of constitutional lawyers and arbitration judges, who found and cultivated a specialist 
niche in the ICC and Hague Conference arbitration panels, are being displace by new 
aggressive transnational legal firms under Anglo-American and German legal 
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transjurisdictional law in highly limited and marginal, and may even be declining, as 
MNCs and others seek judicial redress in national courts (Dasser 2001). Gessner, et al 
(2001) thus conclude: “The lex mercatoria, at least at the present time, seems to have 
far greater significance in the minds of legal scholars and sociologists of law than it 
does for merchants themselves” (p.18) 
 
But whist a strong lex mercatoria may not be in the making, there is little doubt that 
there remains a definite general trend towards a juridification of social, political and 
economic life, at both the domestic and the international levels. This seems 
unstoppable. In many ways this also parallels, and indeed, is part of, the ‘privatization 
of authority’, something that impinges in the case of those many organizations 
mentioned above that seek to manage and regulate GCC.  
 
Can a Company be a ‘Citizen’? 
 
Can corporate bodies like companies be considered as citizens even of a particular 
polity, let alone at the international level? They are certainly creatures of law. 
Companies are incorporated in law as subjects independently of those who own them 
or work in them. This means, for instance that they can sue and be sued in their own 
name, independently of those who either work in them or own them. Strictly 
speaking, then, the shareholder does not ‘own’ the assets of a company. These are 
invested in the company itself. The shareholder owns the right to share in the 
distribution of any surplus generated by the company. Shareholders cannot seize the 
company’s assets at will: there is no unconstrained possession and they have no 
proprietary entitlement in the company’s assets as such. The company owns itself. 
And the managers are also legally constrained to work in the best interests of the 
company in the first instance, not the shareholders. The manager’s role is to supervise 
the continued financial and legal reproduction of the firm – to maintain it as a ‘going 
concern’ and ‘keep the capital intact’, etc. Obviously, a different set of legal 
conditions hold if the company is in liquidation: creditors having prior interest over 
shareholders in this instance. But even here both creditors and shareholders are 
similarly constituted as ‘claimants’ with only a contingent title in respect to the 
company’s assets. What property rights do in this instance, therefore, is attribute no 
more than a capacity or capability to initiate something (like a claim on the assets of a 
firm), which guarantees nothing in terms of outcomes but only contingently arranges 
a series of possibilities for legal disputation and actionable endeavour in the courts 
(see Thompson 1997 for the implications of these legal points for the democratic 
control of companies). 
 
In fact, there are several features of the rights that firms can claim that do parallel 
those of ordinary citizens. The clarification of these is probably easiest to identify in 
the case of US legal practice since here there is appeal to the Constitution for 
clarification (Aligada 2006). The distribution of these is shown in Table 1 below. 
 
[Table 1 near here] 
 
Several implications follow from these points. First it shows how claims are a 
contingent consequence of the status of companies as created by statute law. 
Companies are always incorporated in a definite jurisdiction. But could this give them 
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some respects it does as indicated in the Table. But what it crucially does not confer 
are rights associated with ‘political citizenship’, roughly indicated by those aspects of 
legal citizenship included in the bottom half of the table. A corporation is a legal 
'person' (or subject), but it is a ‘fictitious person’ or ‘virtual person’. Strictly speaking 
citizenship is a legal status only afforded to natural persons.
iv And natural persons 
must posses certain attributes to qualify: they have to be cognate beings, able to 
rationalize and make decisions. It is analytically incorrect therefore to apply the legal 
term ‘citizenship’ to anything other than a natural person (it would be like asking 
whether a dog or a fish, or even a mushroom, can be a citizen). In the normative sense 
however, there seems no reason why a corporation cannot be considered a normative 
citizen. That is, the same 'acts tests' can apply to human persons and corporations: a 
corporation can perform good works, support community initiatives, reduce its 
deleterious impact on the environment, etc. However, all this just shows how poorly 
defined the normative dimension of citizenship is. To talk of corporate citizenship in 
this sense should be recognised for what it really is, no more than a rhetorical strategy 
--- an attempt to disguise a policy option, or set of options pursued, within a 
inappropriate discursive category. Recalling what Marx had to say about utopian 
socialism – that the bourgeoisie want the proletariat to love it – there are no problems 
with corporations trying to be loveable, but they should be loved for the right reasons! 
To call this 'citizenship' is a confusion of categories. We need a new category here, or 
perhaps an older one – namely corporate social responsibility (CSR). That is probably 
an adequate one to describe the normative aspects of ‘lovesick’ companies! 
 
Thus the approach adopted here parts company with what could be termed the 
‘organizational-ethical’ approach to corporate citizenship (Matten &Crane (2005), 
Moon, Crane & Matten (2005)). This approach stresses a normative and ethical notion 
of citizenship to the neglect of its legal and positive definition. It celebrates an 
extended vision of the corporate social responsibility agenda, very much driven by a 
commitment to ‘ethical acts’ and participation by companies in fulfilling – or taking 
over -- civic duties in the name of their ‘values’. This is considered in a basically 
‘domestic context’, where deliberative democracy occupies a key role in pushing the 
normative agenda. Apart from the comments already made earlier about the 
shortcoming of this approach in respect to category mistakes and the dangers of a lack 
of attention to status aspects of citizenship, it also invests too much in the idea of 
deliberation to the detriment of substantive notions of democracy (deliberative norms 
refer to democratic aspects of activity such as transparency, due process, the 
representativeness of participants, etc.: substantive norms refer to rule of law, genuine 
contestation and compromise over policies and outcomes, separation of powers, 
including, crucially, an independent judiciary, freedom of the press, etc.). For 
deliberative democracy, ‘procedure’ is everything in terms of democracy, just as this 
now animates the commitment to a certain conception of citizenship by the corporate 
‘organizational-ethical’ approach (see also Mills & Stephens (2005) who are rightly 
concerned about the lack of a commitment to substantive democracy in Slaughter’s 
networking model of global judicial civic virtue). 
 
In an overt international context, of course, it is convenient to underplay the status 
aspects of citizenship because these just cannot operate there in the same way that 
they might in a domestic context; there is no obvious substantive polity with the 
administrative or governing capacity to establish and enforce citizenship rights and 
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claim, advocate and monitor GCC aspect of MNCs business practices as they see 
them. These are not inconsequential in practice, and they may have a genuine impact 
on the nature of some international businesses in a CSR context (Thompson 2005). 
When faced with this combination of actual organizations, Figure 3 explores a 
preliminary way to categorise them. It illustrates the distribution of those bodies 
designed to advocate for and monitor the GCC activities of companies. Two types of 
political objective are shown (democratic sovereignty and social justice) and two 
types of regime (communitarian and cosmopolitan). Representative organizations that 
fit into each of the cells are also illustrated. A task for future research would be to add 
further examples so as to build a robust picture of the importance of each cell and the 
types of bodies that fit into them. This will also involve drawing a clearer distinction 
between those organizations of advocacy and those of monitoring, which are rather 
run together here. What Figure 3 does is to provide another ‘layer’ to the multi-level 
governance structure of CSR/GCC. 
 
[Figure 3 near here] 
 
But does a lot of the activity centred around what these organization do amount to 
‘constitutionalization’ by the back door? Are we seeing an informal, unrecognised, 
almost surreptitious emergence of global constitutionalizing creeping up on us 
unnoticed as these organizations go about their business of advocating and promoting 
GCC? 
 
Take the UNs Global Compact as an example. This was launched in 2000 as Kofi 
Annan invited the corporate world to join the UN in a partnership to advance the 
agenda of corporate citizenship. This involves a set of ten principles (not rules) 
associated with the usual issues of social responsibility: human rights, working 
conditions, environmental preservation, anti-corruption, etc. As of October 2006 there 
were 3689 signatories, 2900 of which were companies. These are voluntary codes of 
course and there is no enforcement mechanism. It is often described as an enabling 
and learning network (see McIntosh et al 2004). And this initiative has encouraged a 
set of other similar initiatives by the UN to engage the private actors in various forms 
of  sponsorship for responsible behaviour (e.g. Principles for Responsible 
Investment). But there are issues over the nature of such a ‘partnership’ with private 
businesses, which the UN Department of Legal Affairs has been at pains to address 
(Guidelines on Cooperation Between the UN and the Business Community, July 
2000). The UN is an intergovernmental body that has a clear status in international 
law. MNC are aggregations of resources and a jumble of national holding companies 
with no clear status in international law. So what exactly is the UN doing forging 
partnerships with these agents who thereby agree to adhere to its principles? A good 
deal of this is couched in quasi-legal language. And whilst there is a precedent for the 
UN to engage with civil society actors like NGOs, these are closely scrutinized (even 
regulated) in terms of their representativeness, their geographical location, 
organizational structure, etc. No such scrutiny is involved with partner companies. 
Anyone can join from anywhere. 
 
Somewhat similar issues arise in the case of the OECDs Principles on Multinational 
Companies, though the OECD is not a recognized agent in international law. But its 
principles have a semi-official status. Each member state has a National Contact Point 
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government office (in the UK in the DTI). It can hear complaints against companies 
initiated by a number of actors, including accredited trade union bodies, employee 
associations and NGOs. However, companies cannot be sanctioned because, rather 
like the principles of the Global Compact, the OECD principles are also voluntary. 
They only involve moral suasion. The NCPs can, however, call for arbitration, and 
such meetings are conducted in a quasi-legal manner, though lawyers are not involved 
in the actual process. Information suggests, however, that lawyers are involved in the 
run up to any arbitration, providing advice and suggestions for strategy and tactics. 
 
The point about these and other mechanisms that could be discussed here is that they 
smack of ‘constitutionalization’ by the back door. They would seem to involve, at 
least in part, an evolving semi-formal system of customary commercial law 
addressing issues traditionally associated with global corporate citizenship. They 
might thus be viewed as ‘acts’ that are thereby conferring ‘statuses’ that were either 
not intended or for which there is no proper legitimate authority. 
 
 
The ‘Good Citizen’ 
 
A number of leading firms involved in the GCC movement claim to be ‘good global 
citizens’. What, then, is meant by the idea of a ‘good citizen’? Étienne Balibar (2004) 
suggests the good citizen is one that forsakes a more central or ‘primary’ allegiance or 
identity for a ‘secondary’ identity based upon the allegiance to a nation state. S/he is 
one who forsakes their community for a citizenship. And in particular, the ‘good’ 
citizen is one who ‘undoes’ their relationship with a ‘pervious’ realm of identity 
formation based upon a ‘community’ to join a new national community or forum, 
which itself confers a citizenship status as discussed above. Then, and only then, can 
the individual join their new community.  
 
Thus this idea of a good citizen implies a distinction be drawn between community --
and allegiance thereunto -- and a citizenry allegiance; between status as a member of a 
community and status as a member of a national forum or citizenry. (Note here that 
both the act and the status are combined and conferred in such a single move?) 
 
Clearly, this idea draws on a distinction between what might be called primary 
identity (PI) and secondary identity (SI). PI is assumed to be based upon attributes 
like class, sex, religion, familial position, regional of local association, linguistic 
grouping, ethnic status, etc., i.e. something ‘primary’ about existence. SI, on the other 
hand, is assumed to be based on national, civic or ‘public community’ attributes. I 
wonder whether this provides a basis – at least in part -- for distinguishing between 
the cultural emphasis on acts citizenship and the more political notion of status 
citizenship? Acts citizenship would seem to more close emerge from that activity 
associated with primary identities, while status citizenship would seem to be more 
closely associated with secondary identities. 
 
What is the relationship between PI and SI? To be a good citizen requires the 
subjugation of the PI statuses to those of the SI statuses. Thus, in a way, the PIs are 
folded into the SIs; they (the PIs) become recognized and legitimized only by being 
registered first in the form of SIs statuses. In a sense this reverses the order of the 
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sexual ‘community’, etc. As might be expected, however, this is the site of a major 
resistance. The PIs resist being subjugated and integrated into the SIs. And this can 
take a long time to come about, and could be reversed (is being reversed?) as, for 
instance, transterritiorial religious fundamentalisms re-emerge in the modern world 
(Thompson 2006). 
 
This idea of the good citizen casts a particular shadow over, or into, the space of 
sovereignty. The ‘bad citizen’ – one who takes to be a citizen just in name, who 
cannot cast of the bonds of their primary community perhaps – undermines 
sovereignty by being cosmopolitan, trans-national, extra-territorial in their allegiances 
or identities. It is the good citizen who confirms sovereignty. 
 
 Many of these observations could illuminate the idea of the good corporate citizen, 
but in this case in a reverse manner. It is the good global corporate citizen who would 
seem to precisely cast off the burden on the national arena to become footloose and 
cosmopolitan. 
 
Networks and International Liberalism Again 
 
But what about Slaughter’s rather less systematic approach to networks in this area? I 
have tried to situate her approach in terms of Figure 4, which adds a final ‘layer’ of 
governance, this time with respect to the global level. Whilst, again, this is a 
preliminary specification, the point in that Slaughter’s approach is very much driven 
by an ‘American’ cultural view of how constitutional and legal matters are to be 
treated. Given the division of Figure 4 into ‘popular’ and ‘constitutional/republican’ 
forms of democratic processes on the one hand, and the institutionalization of politics 
into ‘representative’ and ‘governmental’ forms on the other, her ‘networks of elites’ 
would fall into the ‘constitutional/republican- governmental’ cell.  
 
[Figure 4 near here] 
 
One could distinguish this, in particular, from a more popular but representative 
option, which might be characterized as another form of the World Government 
approach (involving deliberative law making by some form of popular assembly). In 
fact, this is close to the Wilsonian liberal view from which Slaughter is a pains to 
distance her own approach. Wilsonian liberalism (named after the US President in the 
1920s) is one that attempts to replicate domestic courts at the international level; to 
project domestic law and institutions onto the international plane. It stresses the 
spread of education and liberal democratic values so as to establish institutions to 
resolve international disputes peacefully; encouraging domestic public opinions to 
restrain governments’ war-like tendencies. Under this regime, there is no world 
supreme court enforcing a monolithic international law. (One might reflect on the fate 
of this doctrine with the challenge of post 2001 -2003 US foreign and defence policy). 
In contrast, Slaughter’s own approach is what might call ‘liberal realist’ one. 
 
Interestingly, there is an alternative proposal for how one might better govern the 
WTO in particular -- but which could be extended in principle to the international 
juridical system more generally -- which does not rely upon the operation of elite 
networks to secure some semblance of international ‘social legitimacy’. This is the 
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WTO this would open up the disputes settlement mechanism to a wider set of 
stakeholders through an extension of standing rules to formally included private 
parties, as well the incorporation of various social, ethical and environmental norms 
within WTO law, such that stakeholders could actually use the WTO system to 
enforce such norms against Member States. Clearly, this would involve significant 
reforms in international law and its dispute settlement procedures, but it would help to 
widen the values and interests beyond the single minded focus on liberalizing trade to 
included things like distributive justice, human health and safety and environmental 
concerns. In Figure 3, this option is placed in the ‘popular-democratic/governmental-
institutionalization of politics’ box of the matrix. 
 
Which of these ‘options’ is either feasible or desirable in an international context? 
There are good reasons to have reservations about Slaughter’s approach if this is a 
reasonable way of characterizing it. It neglects substantive democratic considerations 
in its emphasis on unrepresentative elites and displays many ‘blind spots’ about the 
undemocratic operation of domestic law and judges (particularly as in the USA). 
Again, it is procedural in character rather than concerned with administrative 
capacities, legitimacy and accountability. So far the neglected option is that given the 
name ‘intergovernmentalism’ in Figure 4; situated in the ‘representative-
constitutional/republican’ box. The WTO is the illustrative organizational instance of 
this, the practices of which have been critically discussed above. But this was because 
of the tendency written into its particular organizational form that has lead to an 
‘over-constitutionalization’ of its operations (Howse & Niolaïdis 2001, Broude 2004). 
One consequence of this is that intergovernmentalism is now neglected in 
international relations discussions; it is looked upon as the poor cousin, the least 
favoured and least relevant form of international governance in a so called ‘globalized 
world’ However, intergovenmentalism (sometimes called ‘multilateralism’) has much 
to recommend it, particularly -- as shown above -- in that it is national courts and 
national judicial arenas that continue to hold the key to the actual way adjudication is 
working in the current international legal environment (something also stressed by 
Slaughter herself). It offers at least an indirect form of accountability, via the way that 




Are we witnessing the emergence of a nascent common law of international trade – if 
not a new Lex Mercatoria then a new form of international law? In the case of trade 
law there are signs of this (Wield 2000). The same regulatory measures are coming 
into existence within the jurisdictional reach of more than one trade regime (NAFTA; 
EU; WTO) which may even adjudicate simultaneously. There is considerable overlap 
and convergence in the material law of dispute settlement in these trade regimes, 
sometimes emerging egregiously by mutual adoption, sometimes jurisprudentially as 
in case law covering discriminatory internal regulation (‘the removal of obstacles’) or 
taxation. There is a general strengthening of private parties in all regimes, which are 
allowing and encouraging private party dispute resolution in a whole range of areas 
(even the WTO suffers from this as private actors can find ways to manipulate the 
system to reach adjudication under the guise of intergovernmentalism). This may not 
yet amount to full constitutionalization but may be enough to warrant the epitaph of 
an emergent common field of international trade law. What remains of considerable 
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almost unseen within the interstices of international common law associated with the 
‘voluntary regulation’ of MNCs and other agencies. 
 
However, if this is emerging, it is important not to over-exaggerate its significance 
and extent. Additionally, the key to understanding this is to see it in terms of its 
impact on domestic judicial review and national municipal law, rather than as 
something necessarily transnational in character. And just as international public and 
private law continues to retain its municipal reference points so too with the actual 
establishment of trade law amongst and between intergovernmental organizations and 
trading blocs (Duina 2006). Just because these regimes may be adopting similar 
formal legal precepts and protocols does not mean that the variable ways of 
operationalizing these are all the same. These vary in their application as between 
blocs – heavily dependent upon their existing legal cultures with which they interact -
- where their ‘meanings’ are adapted and folded into existing practices and 
frameworks. 
 
Finally, on the question of ‘citizenship’ this looks to be an inappropriate category to 
deploy in an international context. And this is not just a matter of nomenclature; it has 
significance that corporations cannot be considered as global citizens. It means that 
the attention must be politically directed back into the domestic arena, and onto 
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Figure 1: Company Attitudes Towards CSR/GCC  
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Figure 3: Sorting Out GCC Advocacy Organizations 
 
 
































































Note: WB = World Bank; WEF = World Economic Forum; ICGN = International 
Corporate Governance Network; WBCSD = World Business Council for Social 
Development; (I)NGOs = International Non-Governmental Organizations. 
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Table 1: CORPORATIONS CLAIMS ON FORMAL ‘LEGAL CITIZENSHIP’ 
(USA) 
 
They can claim the following: 
 
a)  equality of protection and treatment  
b)   trial by jury  
c)  protection from unreasonable searches and seizures (e.g. of property) 
d)  protection from takings without compensation  
e)  the exercise of due process  
f)  non-discrimination.  
 
They cannot claim the following: 
 
a)  protection against self-incrimination (i.e. the prevention of a witness from 
testifying against him-self or her-self);  
b)   that corporations and their officers are the same ‘person’ (thus corporations 
are separate from their officers -- whereas there is no analogously similar 
claim that can be made by ‘natural person) 
c)  claim certain protections whilst abroad 
d)   they cannot command a vote, or exercise any of the political consequences 
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i The ATCA was passed by the first US Congress in 1789 and was initially designed to tackle piracy on 
the high seas. Formally it still gives US federal courts jurisdiction over “any civil action for a tort only, 
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States”. It can be read as giving 
US courts jurisdiction over non-criminal abuses that occur anywhere in the world, so long as the 
alleged wrong would violate international law (A-M. Slaughter & D.L. Bosco ‘Alternative Justice’   < 
http://www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/atca/2001/altjust.htm> ). As of 2006 there had been 36 
corporate ATCA cases initiated in the US mostly over alleged human rights abuses by companies. But 
not a single one of these had by then been formally adjudicated on. (Baue, B. ‘Win or Lose in Court’ < 
http://www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/atca/2006/06winlose.pdf>). 
ii It should be noted that this figure pertains to the possible effects on performance and bottom line 
financial considerations of attitudes towards e&sv only. It does not illustrate the overall financial 
performance of companies. For instance Ryanair is a highly profitable company despite it appearing as 
a ‘bottom feeder’ here. 
iii In fact, companies are absolutely central to the way the WTO functions and has evolved. See, for 
instance, Sell (2003) for a fascinating account of how the WTO was influenced by American 
companies in particular over the TRIPS Agreement and the copyrighting of intellectual property. 
iv There may be some partial exceptions to this norm. For instance, the Lord Mayor of London is not an 
elected official but an appointed one. And he or she speaks and votes for City (commercial) interests in 
the governance/government structure of the City of London. In addition, in Hong Kong, there are 
special representatives of certain commercial interests who can vote in the legislature, who are not 
exactly elected by a constituency, but, in effect, appointed by it. However, these tend to be marginal 
cases, ones either of an historical anomaly with little real power, or arrangements designed to deal with 
very limited and unusual situations. 
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